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Abstract This article is about selective abortion. It concentrates on the existential, moral
and social conditions that arise when pregnant women, using prenatal diagnosis (PND), are told
that there is something seriously wrong with the foetuses that they are carrying. This is char-
acterised as a micro state of emergency, where both normal cognitive categories and normative
orders are dissolved. The analyses are anchored in the womens’ own presentations and under-
standings of the processes and dilemmas related to the abortion decisions, and our most important
empirical materials are interviews with women who have experienced them. Our main ambition is
to show the relation between some important dimensions of the situation in which the abortion
decision has to be made, and the special kind of authority on behalf of the women that presents
itself. Of equal importance is the vulnerability of the pregnant women, resulting in a co-production
of the women as both Sovereigns and Homo Sacer in the decision situation. We also analyse
some of the experienced relations between the women and the foetuses, and how the women
constitute themselves as moral subjects, with a particular emphasis on the motifs of sacrifice and
self-sacrifice. It is a central argument in the article that we have to understand the specificity of the
decision situation, without reducing it either to other phases (before or after) of the total pro-
cesses of PND and selective abortion, or to general discourses of disability or normality.
The specificity of the situation in which the abortion decision is made is a pivotal point in society’s
regulation (in a broad sense) of the field and in the constitution of the regime of selective
abortion.
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Introduction
Prenatal diagnosis (PND) and selective abortion are closely connected. The majority of those
who exhibit serious foetal defects decide to abort, and many have noted that PND contains an
institutional expectation of selective abortion. Nonetheless, the actual decision remains an
unexplored area in presentation and analysis, with a few exceptions. The direct conclusion
from diagnosis to result (that is, whether or not to abort) misses the central process where the
most essential effects are produced. The state in which the decision is made is a pivotal point in
our prenatal diagnostic regime. We cannot understand society’s relation to selective abortion
without studying the logic of this decision.
We deliberately use the word ‘decision’ and not ‘choice’. The latter carries connotations
of a moral philosophical debate based on idealised situations, which are far removed from the
real world. Instead, we want to analyse the phenomenology of PND and selective abortion.
We will not evaluate the thoughts and reasons of the pregnant women concerning selective
abortion on the basis of theoretical, ethical perspectives. This does not imply that we have no
normative intentions. They are different from and more relevant than imagining and judging
ethical validity claims, an activity which in many ways has come to a dead end. If we make
some steps to understand the decision as a practical empirical event, we may be able to
develop a critique of how its diverse conditions produce decisive effects. Even a small
contribution in this direction will be of vital normative importance.
We will start with the situation when a pregnant woman finds out that there is something
seriously wrong with the foetus. The analyses are anchored in the women’s own presentations
of the processes and dilemmas. On the basis of the stories of individual women, we will
analyse the existential, moral, social and political conditions of the decision-making process
around selective abortion. Even if there is both dissonance and continuity in the presented
stories, we maintain that it is possible to develop a central social and political logic from the
individual narratives.
The article is not about the decision process related to so-called ‘blind abortions’, where the
women do not have any specific knowledge about the conditions of the foetuses. We
concentrate on selective abortions, and the women in our material really want a child, the
pregnancies are most often planned and their social and economic situations do not make the
arrival of a new child problematic.
There is another qualification which is even more important. We will not be exploring the
discourses of disability in society. In many of the individual stories in our material, the foetus
will have no chance at all to survive a birth. In these cases, the link between the decision
process and the general conditions of disabled people will be very hard to establish. When the
newborn child may not only survive but live for many years, the connection will be important
to analyse. Intuitively the political, social and cultural discourses and conditions of disabled
people may constitute a vital background for the decision processes in such cases.1 However,
we resist a direct and automatic import of the general logic. First of all, the specifics of the
situation (after a serious defect in the foetus is discovered) must be analysed and understood.
1 There is a very heated ethical debate regarding the nature of this link. Shakespeare (2006) discusses the so-
called “expressivist objection” to PND and concludes: “Nor should we interpret a decision to have a test or
a termination as expressing disrespect or discrimination towards disabled people” (p. 102). For a critique of
Shakespeare’s position, see Holm (2008).
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Only then can we start the hard and cumbersome work of establishing the links between
the selective abortion decisions and the general discourses and conditions of disability. There
might be some surprises. That is the nature of empirical work. There is a possibility of very
paradoxical relations, as well as of the discovery of a decision logic that cannot so easily be
reduced to the dominating disability discourses. One of the main objectives of the article is to
contribute to establish a necessary foundation for the discussion of these relations.
We also want to clarify the empirical scope of the article. The topic is neither the decision
processes leading to the engagement with prenatal diagnostic technologies, nor how the
women present and explain their abortion decisions to their families, friends and other
relations after the abortions. These are different phases, possibly involving very different logic.
Also on this point, we resist a reductionist approach. Neither the before, nor the after, may
directly explain what is going on in the critical situation when a selective abortion decision is
made.
Since the other two phases are also parts of our total research material (Risøy, 2010),2
we will only briefly indicate that they are governed by social logic that are more compatible
with the general disability discourses, as well as the ‘normal’ hierarchical relations between
medical experts and patients. The health system and medical apparatus perform with their
normal authority in the early phase and recommend various examinations to pregnant
women, but there is a strong undertone of something else when genetic counselling is offered.
In such cases it is communicated that anything is a possibility in PND, and if the women find
themselves in a situation in which defects are detected, the doctors will no longer be able to tell
them what they should do. This is a break with regular medical practice. Diagnoses are
normally followed by authoritative advice on treatment, if available, but during counselling
there is a warning of the retreat of medical authority. Future situations are indicated in which
there will be no normative guidance,3 and the pregnant women must therefore be prepared for
something out of the ordinary.
The Field of Research
Although medical research on PND and selective abortion has been concerned with the
choices that a woman faces, genetic counselling, various conceptions of risk and women’s
reactions after selective abortion, it is often quantitative and does not probe very deeply into
personal experience. The social and political aspects are only superficially present (Salvesen
et al, 1997; Grimes and Snively, 1999; Getz and Kirkengen, 2003; Kersting et al, 2004, 2005,
2009; Burgoine et al, 2005; Keefe-Cooperman, 2005; Korenromp et al, 2005a, b; Getz, 2006;
Skari, 2006; Offerdal, 2008). The work of philosophical ethics often says little about those
practical morals which guide the actual concrete decisions that are made on selective abortion,
2 The study was done with financial support from the Norwegian Research Council.
3 This is partly because genetic counselling is meant to be normatively neutral. Medicine’s conception of ‘the
patient’s best interests’ is replaced with information on the range of possible choices. Markens (2013) has
interviewed genetic counsellors in the United States about their views on genetic testing, with a particular
emphasis on prenatal testing. They generally have positive attitudes, underlining the ‘empowerment’ of
women, widening the range of choices and supporting ‘health management’. Although there might be some
cultural differences between Norway and the United States, our short analysis indicates that there are some
other important dimensions present.
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or what connections these decisions can have to social and political regimes (Tännsjö, 1991;
Singer, 1994; Purdy, 1996, 2001; Habermas, 2003; Solberg, 2008).
The social science and humanistic studies of the public and political debate on PND and
selective abortion (Bakshi, 2000; Flatseth, 2009) intersect with our study. However, it cannot
be taken for granted that the same discourses dominate politics and praxis.
Rothman (1986) and Rapp (1987, 1999) were pioneers in social science studies of praxis.
Rothman’s concept of “tentative pregnancy” led to later perspectives on PND, genetic
counselling and risk assessment (Heyman et al, 2006; Samerski, 2006, 2009; Schwennesen
et al, 2008; Schwennesen and Koch, 2009; Kato, 2009; Gupta, 2010; Ivry, 2010; Harris
et al, 2013; Markens, 2013). Rapp showed how women in this field came to be constituted
as moral pioneers. It became a woman’s responsibility both to explore the variances of
different perspectives of normality and also to make decisions. Although some of the
dilemmas regarding PND have resonance in the decision process of selective abortion, the
two situations are ontologically different. ‘What if’ will always be different from ‘happened
to me’.
There has been some recent social science research focusing on the decisions of selective
abortion. McCoyd (2007, 2008, 2009a, b), as we ourselves have done, looked at the whole
process that the woman goes through, from the choice of diagnostics to the grief afterwards.
McCoyd (2007) describes how “good mothers” do not have “bad” babies, and that there
exists a cultural contract in pregnancy which is broken if one consciously brings a child with
defects into the world. Selective abortion in Vietnam (Kato, 2009; Gammeltoft, 2014) and
India (Gupta, 2010) has been the focus of recent research.4 Gammeltoft (2014) shows how
reproductive choices in Vietnam are shaped by a concept of belonging rather than the
individualistic concept of freedom. These studies show how selective abortion decisions are
shaped by general social and cultural logic. In contrast, we analyse the exceptional nature of
the situations in which these decisions are made, and thereby we show the limitations of
normal social order and discourses.
Legal and Institutional Context
In Norway, there is a routine offer of an ultrasound examination in weeks 17–19, which is
accepted by almost all pregnant women. Although it is not obligatory, the examination is
perceived as such by most women. There is a legal distinction between ultrasound as prenatal
care and diagnosis. The difference lies in the intention: is it to search for defects (PND) or to do
a ‘follow-up’ on the pregnancy (prenatal care)? The examination in weeks 17–19 is legally
defined as prenatal care, and as such no genetic counselling is given before it. In spite of the
legal status the quasi-obligatory examination is used to search for and identify defects, and the
majority of them are in fact detected in this way. The result is a combined legal, social and
psychological paradox: the routine ultrasound, which was neither defined nor perceived
beforehand as a prenatal diagnostic, is perhaps its most important tool. It is primarily women
aged 38 years or more at the time of birth, or who have special indications, who receive a
4 Gupta interviewed the women and their husbands after they had received councelling on the basis of risk
profiles, but before they had amniocentesis. Although there were good practical reasons for this choice, there
are some methodological fallacies associated with it.
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direct offer of double and triple testing5 and invasive methods such as amniocentesis and
placental biopsy, as well as ultrasound with the specific intention of detecting defects. Of
course, if there are indications of possible defects in the examinations during weeks 17–19
then the women are followed up by the medical system and are offered the same kind of tests.
Genetic counselling is given before these targeted examinations.
In most cases, women must decide whether or not to terminate the pregnancy once defects
are detected. It is only in rare cases that the foetus can be operated on while still in the womb
or directly following birth.6 In Norway, abortion is based on free choice up to and including
the 12th week of pregnancy. After this, access to abortion is regulated by committees and the
Abortion Act §2 c, which is called “the eugenics paragraph”, becomes relevant. It states that
abortion can be performed when “there is a great danger that the child can have serious
illness”. In practice, the committees almost automatically give permission for abortion when
a woman applies on the basis of foetal defects. In reality, there is also a free choice of selective
abortion after the 12th week. The Act places an absolute limit on termination at viability.
As a consequence, there is no time limit for abortion or induced labour if the foetus is not
viable because of the defect.
Our Study
In the study, we undertook a comprehensive examination of different aspects of women’s
encounters with PND and selective abortion. We carried out observations of laboratory work,
genetic counselling, ultrasound examinations, and the collection of amniotic fluid samples and
placenta biopsies. The most important data are the interviews. Fifteen interviews were
conducted with doctors, priests, midwives, administrative employees, social workers and
genetic counsellors at the hospital. Twenty-three interviews were conducted with women who
have had experiences with PND. Eight of them had amniocentesis performed without any
defects being detected, whereas 15 women did show defects in the foetus. Of the latter, 12
decided to have selective abortion, whereas 3 decided to carry to term despite serious defects.
These informants were chosen through a process in which the main objective was to achieve
variation and breadth of diagnoses. We wanted to include both borderline cases, in which
there can be disagreement over the severity of the PND,7 as well as different types of terminal
defects. The women were not recruited either through hospitals or the health system, but
rather by placing advertisements on Websites and Web forums. This has both pros and cons
methodologically. The recruitment is based on a self-selection process in which those who
were motivated to speak about their experiences made contact with the project. At the same
time, the women did not associate the interviewers with the professionals with whom they
5 The tests are biochemical analyses of maternal blood, and give an individual risk for Trisomy 13, 18 and 21
and ‘open defects’ (triple test). The risk assessment is calculated on the basis of these tests, ultrasound results
and the mother’s age.
6 In our material we do not find any traces of the aggressive discourse of hope, which is prevalent among
many patient groups, as well as on the political level, in relation to the new genetics and biomedicine (Brekke
and Sirnes, 2011). There is, however, an interesting parallel concerning the sovereignty of suffering, which
has important implications for the normative regime.
7 We are referring to where there is social disagreement over whether a certain diagnosis will be the cause of
great pain and suffering for the future child or family. Klinefelter syndrome can be an example.
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were in contact during the process of PND and selective abortion, and the project avoided
being tainted by the authority structures which dominate the health system.
In our study, we have explored all the phases that women go through, from the first
ultrasound examination through to the grief after abortion. But the article focuses on the
situation after defects are shown in the foetus and until a choice is made concerning
abortion. The theme is the abortion decision. We want to analyse how the women
experience the decision situation, and therefore we concentrate on the interviews with
the women.
The women were interviewed some time after the actual processes. There are several reasons
for this. First, we recruited women who wanted to talk about their experiences in retrospect.
Second, the ethical principles left us with no other choice, as we did not want to influence and
affect the women in their most critical and vulnerable situations. This was a deliberate strategy.
In addition, the nature of the ethical regime in Norway makes such interference nearly
impossible. This research strategy has, however, some methodological implications. For
example, there may be some distortions of memory and retrospective rationalisations. On the
other hand, the different phases of the women’s experiences, and especially that which is the
topic of this article, obviously made a very strong psychological impact. During the interviews
the women re-experienced some socio-psychological conditions which were very hard to
forget, and to a large degree they seemed to relive the phenomenology of the decision situation.
We will now address the situation that arises when something wrong with the foetus is
detected.
The Shock
Reidun and Mette dramatically recount the “obligatory” examination in the 18th week of
pregnancy.
So we came in and lay down on the table and she explained what they were going to do
(…) Then she made a jerk with her head, and she got very quiet. I thought that this isn’t
good (…) So I thought, no, no, don’t get hysterical. Then she said: I see here that there is
something wrong. And so the whole world just collapsed, really.
Reidun, abort, Hydrocephalus
Something dramatic is foreshadowed when the midwife becomes quiet. The silence signals
the dissolution of the logic of the examination. This is no longer ‘prenatal care’ but ‘PND’.
Subconsciously this possibility must have been present, as the dark emotions start flowing
even before the midwife says anything about the foetus. The quote then presents the
theoretical challenge of our research: we must try to understand the social dimensions and
implications of the total collapse when ‘something wrong’ is detected.
So it was just routine, you know? We were at [name] hospital and they are probably not
so good [with] ultrasound: “See, an arm”, “see, a leg”, and so on for about 45minutes,
then it was suddenly: “Oh”, there was this sack filled with fluid on the baby’s neck. And
then it was full speed into [name of hospital]. So it came as a shock.
Mette, abortion, Mosaic Down syndrome
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There was a strong contrast in the situation between before and after the discovery.
The following shock makes the calm state characterising the examination (routine) look naïve,
and the new severity of the situation is expressed both by the change of pace and the
mobilisation of better medical competence at the new hospital.
“In the beginning of December last year, we had an ultrasound check-up and were very
happy.We were a little naïve, but had no idea that something would be wrong”, beginsKjersti’s
narrative. This is what happened when they returned for the next ultrasound examination:
I asked the midwife if the water on the brain was gone, since she said the last time that the
baby had water on the brain, but that it was normal when it wasn’t so big. She said “not
completely”. Then I began to get a bit uneasy, but not so much. The same doctor as the last
time came in and they began to tell me what was wrong. The baby had an umbilical hernia,
but it could be operated on, so I didn’t take it so hard. Then they found something wrong
with the kidneys and worst of all, the head … After this, everything was just chaos in my
head. I sat there with [my husband] and the midwife and she said in a nice way that the
baby had a number of problems, but that she would send us to [a larger hospital] because
they had specialists there. But I didn’t understand why I should go there. I was over the
time limit for abortion (21 weeks) so I said that. But she said: no, this is a special case, so…
don’t remember any more. She held me with tears in her eyes, a wonderfully fine lady who
I have talked to since also. They made an appointment at [the larger hospital] for the next
day and we went home. Can’t explain what we were thinking. It was just unreal.
Kjersti, abortion, Trisomy 18
The beginning of the process was marked by the same retrospect naïvety, and even the water
on the brain that had been detected during the first ultrasound did not cause any great
insecurity. But her unease increased steadily until the problems with the kidneys and brain
created emotional chaos. The medical staff’s most important contribution was the attempt at
sharing this condition and trying to break the loneliness of the situation. Kjersti did not realise
that the defects had removed the foundation for the normal legal regulation of abortion, and
that the 21-week limit was therefore no longer valid. Essentially her experience cannot be
communicated. The situation is overburdened with the inexplicable. This characterises the
new, dramatic subject position of a woman who is pregnant with a baby with which
something seriously wrong is detected.
Even if prenatal diagnostic examinations such as amniocentesis or placental biopsy are
understood as a search for disabilities, finding what they are actually searching for is beyond
imagination.Mona expresses this paradox:
I live healthily and have borne four healthy children, and have become pregnant
immediately. So I didn’t imagine that it would … It was just for safety, for safety’s
sake (…) I was most excited to find out the sex, that was what I was waiting for (…)
Well, no, I got an absolute shock, of course. It was beyond the pale of what I had
expected was going to happen. Because there are so few, it’s so unlikely… .
Mona, abort, Down syndrome
The fact thatMona had experience with amniocentesis from earlier pregnancies without any
defects being detected, and also the fact that she had on four occasions proven her
reproductive capability, was important for her expectations of the test. The difference between
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before and after the discovery – “just for safety” and “absolute shock” – could not be greater.
In addition, earlier priorities vanish. Although she had a desire for knowing the gender, the
diagnosis totally overshadowed this question; the fact that the foetus was a girl was not
mentioned until a long way into the interview.8 Statistics, which had probably given her a false
sense of security, afterwards added to the extraordinary nature of her situation.
Charlotte knew that she was a carrier of Fragile X syndrome and did not wish to bring
a child into the world that was either a carrier or affected. She was therefore active and had
a placental biopsy performed. After some waiting, they received the message that everything
was fine, and that they could enjoy the pregnancy. But then this happened:
She called me. (…) And so I smiled a little and said that “Now, you shouldn’t scare me.
I’m getting some bad vibes here”. And so she says that “Yes, unfortunately, I have to
give you some bad news”, And as you can imagine, I fell apart a bit. It was affected after
all. (…) My husband was in the neighborhood so he got there in about three minutes…
and so we talked about it with each other and decided that we would have an abortion
as soon as possible. So we talked to [the hospital], and they say that, this was on
a Thursday, they say that “You can come on Sunday and have it done that evening”.
So we tell them that this is not satisfactory, my husband says: “because we want it done
now, and you just need to make it happen”.
Charlotte, abortion, Fragile X
Charlotte was in her 16th week when she received this information. She goes back in time
to the moment when she took the telephone call and describes her feelings: “It was, of course,
chaos. Then it was: is this possible? How can you get a message like that? How is it possible
to be so wrong? Can they treat people in this way? Anger at the hospital”. The shocking
experience that Charlotte underwent was actually the hospital’s mistake. She made the
conscious choice to search for defects, with the clear intention of terminating the pregnancy if
they were found. But the medical system failed her. Even though she was prepared for finding
Fragile X syndrome in the first phase, the false test result had calmed her and mentally
established a normal pregnancy. In the next phase, this is transformed into chaos and a
breakdown of meaning.
Facing Normality and Deviation
Ultrasound provides a meeting with the foetus. It becomes humanised and incorporated into the
family.9 The ultrasound picture and the explanation provided by the medical personnel
‘produce’ the human. But what is produced when the examination detects defects in the foetus?
We certainly saw the little heart beating, and the beat was clearly completely healthy.
And sucked on the thumb and, or in any case, scratched itself, now I have heard that
8 “The ‘it’ represented by a positive outcome from the genetic testing for disability becomes a signification of
what can go ‘wrong’ with a fragile humanity. Thus, the ‘girling’ of the ‘girl’ (or the ‘boying’ of the ‘boy’) is
overshadowed by the ‘marker’ disability and its present and future implications” (Overboe 2007).
9 Women experience a new recognition on two levels during ultrasound examinations. They first experience
the realisation that the pregnancy is true and real: “The other is that this fetus is a human, another human,
that she has a body that is not only her own” (Ravn, 2004, p. 264).
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they don’t suck their thumb at 19 weeks. But it was a fully perfect little baby. (…) But
there was no defect on the outside. But much was missing; she had almost no lungs.
Because with Triploid syndrome it’s like the body doesn’t think it has the resources to
develop everything, so it only does the most important parts – the brain and heart. So it
drops, for example, the kidneys. They are certainly of no use anyway, not yet, nor the
lungs, since they are not so necessary in the belly either. So, the way it was: the lungs
were teeny tiny, the kidneys were almost not there. And a lot of intestinal blockage. And
webbed fingers, the ring finger and middle finger on the second and third joints. (…)
And the feet were like small fans (…) They took a long, long time explaining it. About
this and why it was this way and showed again and again, and we asked to see more of
the profile, I wanted to see more. And they really took a long time. I mean, a long, long,
long, long time. I thought it was an eternity.
Sara, miscarriage, approved abortion, Triploid syndrome
Apparently, Sara first points out the normal (the baby sucks at its thumb) and then the
defective. But with a closer reading, it can be seen that the whole quotation, in fact, concerns a
“perfect little baby”, which has shown a very specific kind of survival instinct. Just as a fish
has adapted to its life in water but not on dry land, the foetus has adapted itself to a life in the
womb but not outside it. The fact that the heart was healthy emphasised the foetus’ staying
power under its current conditions. At the same time, it lacked several organs vital for a
separate, individual life. It is as if during pregnancy the foetus prioritised the relationship with
the mother to the extent that it could not survive outside her body. As a consequence, the
relationship became extraordinarily privileged. The ultrasound, showing all the terminal
defects, did not create any distance, but in fact a very special sense of intimacy between the
mother and the foetus. Sara constantly “wanted to see more”, as if the missing organs
intensified the material and emotional bonds between them. The time dimension and sheer
patience of the medical personnel therefore became very important. The long duration and
even all the repetitions of the examination process were very precious – much more than at
‘normal’ ultrasounds.
I wanted to lie here the rest of my life. (…) A necessary eternity. To be able to
just lie there and lie there and look at the heart that just beat and beat (…) it was very
good that so much time was taken.
Sara, miscarriage, approved abortion, Triploid syndrome
In this context it is worth remarking that receiving the initial message that something was
wrong with the foetus represented an extreme burden for Sara: “It was as if everything
disappeared. It was completely empty. So horribly painful at some point inside the pain”. On
the basis of this pain, she established the image of a baby which was ‘perfect’ in its own right.
The next case, Reidun, provides a striking contrast to what we have just seen:
I understood that this was very serious, and we knew there wasn’t much hope. I listened
half-heartedly, but when they went through and saw that something was good, they
certainly said that too. And I think that was a burden, I thought the more that was
positive, the worse it would just be. You had begun thinking about the choice?Yes, since
he had said so much that I understood that… (…) it had a large amount of water on the
brain and outside, between the skull and skin and down the back and in the stomach,
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it was enough for me to see that this is incompatible with life. And so, they began to say
that he has five fingers and five toes and: “Forget about that”, it’s not important. So…
(…) I said that “I can’t take any more now, I want to be done here now.” And so they
finished up pretty quickly then.
Reidun, abortion, Hydrocephalus
In both cases, the defects of the foetus are incompatible with life and led to decisions to have
selective abortions (although a miscarriage preceded it in Sara’s case), but their effects on the
mothers were completely different. Although they were interpreted as an expression of a very
special bond between the mother and the foetus in Sara’s case, they led to dissociation in
Reidun’s case. The non-relation is, however, threatened by the normal features, which confuse
the entire situation. Pointing to five fingers and toes is a humanisation of the foetus. Whereas
Sara embraced the humanisation of a foetus which could not live after birth, Reidun not only
deliberately rejected it, but perceived it as a serious burden imposed on her by further
communication. This also led to a contrasting importance being placed upon time. While
listening to the medical personnel was a consolation and a means of coming to terms with her
destiny for Sara, it increased the vulnerability for Reidun.
Our third case in this section,Guri, represents yet another kind of reality. After she had been
fully informed by the doctor of the defects affecting the child and which possibilities were open
to her, she went home.
The very first thought I had, when I went to bed at night, I thought, “Oh, God, I have
a monster in my belly”. I have seen films, you know, invasions from outer space and
terrible things. Some slimy thing with long arms, it was horribly brown and ugly and
just suddenly exploded out of my stomach. Or just ate me up from inside. That was how
I thought about this human in my belly, the first night I went to sleep. I just thought, get
rid of this belly. I didn’t want it there, take it away, take away this monster.
Guri, abortion, Terminal heart failure
We have neither the privileged relation between the mother and the foetus, as in Sara’s case,
nor the vulnerable non-relation as in Reidun’s. Here, the foetus has become a horrible threat to
the mother or a deadly enemy. Although she does not make a direct reference, it is obviously
the world of the ‘Alien’ films from which Guri takes her associations. In the first film, the
crewmember Kane is invaded and the alien grows inside him until the brutal ‘birth’ takes place,
during which the alien more or less ‘explodes’ out of his stomach, immediately becoming a
mortal threat to the rest of the crew. Guri became pregnant after several IVF attempts. It is
possible that this genesis of the pregnancy amplified the mental connection to the Alien films.10
While Reidun did not want to think or know anything more than absolutely necessary
about the foetus, both Sara and Guri indulged in details, which seemed to be very important
for them. There is a certain beauty in Sara’ description. Guri, however, expresses an extreme
aesthetics of the ugly and monstrous. Sara admires her foetus, whereas Guri is full of repulsion
against what is inside her. There is also a very opposite sense of belonging. Sara’s child belongs
so much to her that it is not able to live outside her body. Guri’s foetus does not belong to her
10 The films thematise reproduction, birth and the relationship between the human and the alien, or animal
(Constable, 1999).
Risøy and Sirnes
326 © 2015 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1745-8552 BioSocieties Vol. 10, 3, 317–340
at all. It is an alien. Therefore the pregnancy is not the growth of a connection, but an
invasion. Whereas Sara’s case expresses an almost too perfect harmony, which makes birth
and biological departure impossible, there is a deadly fight going on in Guri’s. Therefore she
had no choice: the foetus-enemy had to be aborted. Guri tells us that the child for which she
had been so glad, and for which she had already struggled so much, had now taken on the
extreme opposite meaning.
After defects have been detected in the foetus, there is a fundamental decision to be made.
Should it be aborted or not? We have given a picture of a condition characterised by shock
and pain.11 An important dimension is also the feeling of a break with reality: “This is just
a mistake. Soon we will be in the real world again” (Sara). “I began to cry and it was just as
if I was looking down on us from above. Exactly like a film or a nightmare” (Kjersti). It is in
this type of situation, in which there might even be a thin line separating reality from dark
fantasies, that the important decision must be made. The combination of these elements can
be summarised and condensed by a quote from Sara: “It was a state of emergency”. Even if we
are not going to infuse any theoretical intentions into her use of words, there is an important
clue here. In political philosophy, ‘state of emergency’ indicates a situation in which the basic,
normal conditions that are presupposed by social and juridical order do not exist. There are
situations that are too extraordinary for rules to apply. Although these kinds of perspectives
are mostly employed on the state level, we think that they might be productively transposed
to the micro-situation of the abortion decision. We are fully aware that this jump from one
level to another might cause some problems of interpretation, but there are some obvious
reasons for it. The decision situation is potentially dense with juridical aspects, as well as
normative prescriptions constructed on a social and political level. It represents a condensa-
tion of general moral perspectives. In the micro-state of emergency, however, they lack the
silently presupposed basis for being relevant. “ … like the outside world just stopped.
Everything else is so unimportant. It is only inside that room that things happen and
everything outside doesn’t exist” (Reidun, abortion, Hydrocephalus i.a.). In this context, we
may tentatively interpret the norms and rules as belonging to the ‘outside’.
The Decision: Authority
Following this chain of thought, the next essential question is: Which kind of authority is
present, or rather presents itself, under these conditions?
(…) but it was as [the husband] said, it is you who have known life, it is you who carries
it, it is you who will protect it with your body, no matter what I say or do, support you
11 Temporality is a complex issue. It is present in our cases in different ways, and there are several paradoxes.
Although there is an extraordinary legal regime of selective abortions, the medical system to some degree
signals that time is more pressing than it actually is, and this affects the women’s experiences of the situation.
Also, the pace of the process is partly governed by the perceived needs of the women, for instance whether
they want to terminate as soon as possible or whether they need some extra time to come to terms with their
relation with the affected foetus. Generally speaking, there is a socio-psychological paradox present.
Although the women may feel compelled to make the abortion decision within a couple of weeks, several of
them seem to enter a situation of pure presence, or an extraordinary condition where the time dimension as
such is dissolved.
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in or not, it is you who has to shoulder this. And that is not something anyone can
change. And it is true enough, he can [not] go in and make a choice for me, since it is up
to me. And I was also concerned with protecting his feelings and right to be a part of this
decision … so I chose to include, or give him the feeling that you also decide, because
it was important to him. But it didn’t make it any easier.
Vilde, abortion, Klinefelter syndrome
The woman presents herself as the unchallenged decision maker. She expresses this on
behalf of herself and her partner. The man realises and admits that he has no given position,
but can be included by the woman if she so chooses. But a shared decision is not a reality, and
is more of an attempt to give the man “the feeling that you also decide”. The attempt to give
others responsibility therefore fails, as does the desire to be relieved of the burden of the
decision to terminate: “But it didn’t make it any easier”.
Jorunn’s boyfriend did not want a child with Down syndrome. But his reservations
concerning having a “mongoloid boy” makes Jorunn realise that it is her decision whether
or not to carry to term:
No, he didn’t think it was ok. He thought it was fine if we had a baby, but he didn’t
think it was so great to be a pappa to a … mongoloid boy (…) So I thought I had to
decide for myself… .
Jorunn, birth, Down syndrome after amnio
Linda had an abortion after terminal defects were discovered. It was her experience that
those around her wished to influence her decision: “But I actually felt I was pressured a bit,
both by my husband and, he was certain that he didn’t want me to go out”. She also felt
pressure from her mother:
No, [my mother] she couldn’t take it at all. My sister said, before we had decided, that
my mother had said that “I can’t handle this if [Linda] goes around in late pregnancy
with a child that cannot live”. She couldn’t handle it. And it affected me and, while I
didn’t think that it should affect me, since it was me that should decide what I was going
to do, my sister had said to her that [Linda] has to find it out for herself, you can’t tell
her… she meant that it had to be my choice and, yeah, not to mix yourself up in it (…)
But I felt pressured, I did. I had actually made the decision, and so called a doctor, before
we went back. And so then she said that “It is your choice” (…) In one way, I wanted her
to say “Clearly, you have to do it”, you know. But she said “It is your choice”. And she
wouldn’t say what she thought about it either.
Did you ask her?
Yeah, I did.
Linda, abortion, missing kidneys
The influences are both direct and indirect. Ironically, it is Linda’s sister who both conveys
the mother’s pressure and balances it with her own evaluation of the situation, confirming
Linda’s sovereignty. The message is paradoxical. There is strong advice about what to do,
with the mother (or sister?) using her own mental health as a pressure mechanism, while the
very relevance of the advice is undermined. The subjective effect on Linda is two-fold, both
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weakening and strengthening her position. With regard to the doctor she is seeking a way to
escape responsibility. When Linda calls a doctor she “in one way”wanted her to say “Clearly,
you have to do it”. But this was after Linda had actually decided to have an abortion, and
therefore concerns a confirmation of the decision rather than a release from it. The quotation
does not give the impression of a woman swinging back and forth, first following one view
and then another, but in fact shows a woman in the midst of a duality, who stands alone in the
decision to terminate. After all, she is the one who, in spite of the pressures, has the position
and the authority to combine the factors.
I knew that I would never have an abortion, myself, I would not have managed it, but
(…) I have a friend now who has just had an abortion. She (…) chose, after some tough
rounds, to have an abortion. And she was afraid to tell me about it, but I said to her that
“I respect … so much of what you have done”. We all get knocked around here in life,
every one of us, “we have to make tough decisions” and all choices demand equal
respect. So I would never judge a person who had an abortion, either because it wasn’t
a good time to be pregnant, or because they had learned that it was going to be a child
with Down’s syndrome (…) I think it is equally brave to make that decision. Even
more so.
Yes… it… can affect the rest of your life.
Now, to have had our son would have affected the rest of our lives also, but I see it as
a much more positive effect than having to live with such a tough choice that I know
I couldn’t live with.
Gerd, birth, Down syndrome after amnio
Gerd gave birth to a child shown during pregnancy to have Down syndrome. Not even for
her is it possible to criticise the decision to abort a foetus with a similar syndrome. Gerd
cannot evaluate other women’s decisions, only her own. It is only possible to respect the
choices, whether they concern “blind” or selective abortions. The fact that the decision is
“tough” and will “affect the rest of your life” creates an exclusivity that nullifies external
evaluation criteria. The word “brave” indicates the women’s short- and long-term vulner-
ability, which in the end can be shared by no one else. Only the pregnant woman may judge
what it is possible to live with. This is true no matter how the life is affected. It is about
pregnancy and birth as existential events and conditions primarily affecting only the woman.
Everyone else has only a secondary relationship to them, and therefore external judgments are
not an alternative. There is an indisputable authority that presents itself in the decision
situation, which is closely linked to and enhanced by the woman’s exclusive vulnerability.
As a consequence, the abortion decision is individualised.
The Decision: Reasons and Dilemmas
We have tentatively characterised the condition under which the abortion decision is made,
as a micro-state of emergency where the vulnerable woman shows herself to be the sovereign.
As we have indicated, this does not mean that the situation becomes a cognitive and normative
‘black box’. There is a gap of understanding between the pregnant woman and the rest of the
people and actors involved, which partly accounts for her exclusive authority. At the same
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time, there is a dense communication unfolding on many levels, both concerning concrete
bodily and psychological experiences and normative considerations. The women have many
perspectives on the reasons for their decisions, as well as their dilemmas. We will expand on
some of these. First of all, we will enter the situation in which the defects revealed by
ultrasound are incompatible with life.
Incompatible with life
She told us which possibilities we had, but we really didn’t have any choice. I managed to
ask if the baby was in any pain, and she couldn’t answer that, but it most likely didn’t have
any pain … yet. She said that the baby wasn’t “compatible with life” and that it would
never survive outside of my stomach. If I continued the pregnancy, something which she
did not advise, the head would grow so large that I couldn’t give birth in the usual way.
Kjersti, abortion, Hydrocephalus
A woman’s own health may become an element in the situation. In Kjersti’s case, this led to the
doctor giving direct advice not to continue the pregnancy. An abortion can also prevent the
foetus from suffering. The small word “yet” is important in the quote. The foetus will die
anyway, and with an abortion a woman can take the initiative to solve a problem instead of
delaying it. This indicates that a diagnosis of “incompatible with life” functions as a relief for
women faced with the responsibility of making a decision. But does it always work like that, or
does the diagnosis always lessen the dilemma that is represented by the pregnancy and abortion?
We decided very quickly that we would terminate the pregnancy. I felt we were strongly
advised to do so. He said that it was incompatible with life. You can, of course, continue
to term, but this child will surely die in your belly long before that. Plus, I had the
beginnings of pre-eclampsia, which you often get with triploid babies (…) He said that it
would be both a great risk for me… .
Did you consider the other possibility, then?
Yes, very much. I did. Since it sounded so brutal that I would get suppositories which
would instigate labor. And he said that the child wouldn’t survive the contractions
because it was so little that it would die as a result of the contractions. And that I almost
…, I didn’t manage to think that thought. That I should take my child’s life. Even
though it would die later anyway. The thought that I would physically do something
which stopped that heart which I could see was so strong, that was completely
impossible for me to consider. (…) I felt that it was my choice, and that I wasn’t forced,
but that it was horribly painful to make it, and I didn’t see any other solution. Couldn’t
see what the alternatives were. To go on until week 32, or 14 days, and go around the
whole time thinking: is it alive or not? And how … Is this a painful life? I understood
medically that it was the right thing to do. Also because I had begun to be sick. But it still
seemed like an impossible thing to do.
Sara, miscarriage, approved abortion, Triploid
Sara has problems with seeing how the medically correct can be possible, in spite of the
potential “painful life” of the foetus in the womb. This is therefore a narrative about what the
medical system cannot give Sara in her situation. Even though the doctor gives clear and
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justified advice, he cannot do anything about the fact that she must “take [her] child’s life”
and impose on the foetus a birth which will press the life out of it during contractions. As
we have seen above, Sara experienced the relation to her baby as special and privileged,
condensed in and symbolised by the strong heart, which she had to stop beating. Therefore the
diagnosis offered no release, but rather an impossible situation in which there was no
alternative to abortion, while the decision was nevertheless “horribly painful to make”. The
duality is tangible. Also, in spite of the doctor’s advice, there is no doubt about who has the
authority to decide. Although the sovereignty is seen as a deep necessity, it is not at all
experienced as a privilege, but on the contrary as a very heavy burden.
Selective abortion: One’s sacrifice for the child
I was fully ready when she said that she didn’t know if it was in pain, I didn’t want my
child to suffer, especially not when it wasn’t possible to save it. If there had been
something we could have done to make it well, then maybe, but that was not the case.
I have always been against abortion and never thought, I guess, that I would have to
make an impossible choice like this.
Kjersti, abortion, Trisomy 18
Because the condition is “incompatible with life”, the possibility of the child being in pain
steers the decision to abort. Kjersti had “always been against abortion”, and therefore took
responsibility for sparing the child by going against her own moral convictions, even though
this made the choice “impossible”. This moral fracture amplifies the gravity of the situation.
A picture is created of a mother who is willing to sacrifice her own norms and values in order
for the foetus to escape suffering.
There was an immediately strong bond to the child. Which was threatened by something
outside. Or inside.
Do you feel that, after you found out, that the bonds were stronger in those two days?
Yes, much stronger. Yes, very protectively compelled to be a mamma for the child, and
that made it easier to manage a birth. Because I thought that it will be, in any case, the
last thing I do for her. That she is born, that it doesn’t happen any other way. That it is
the last thing I can help her with, either here or there.
Sara, miscarriage, approved abortion, Triploid
What we earlier saw Sara describe as “impossible”, a birth that will kill the foetus, is nuanced
when it is understood as part of being a good mother. The special bond between the foetus and
the pregnant woman, and in this case also between “mamma” and child, is further strengthened
in the days before the abortion. This makes the abortion possible. It creates meaning, involving
a foetus which is threatened and a mother who can protect and sacrifice. Through the sacrifice,
the good mother gives something of importance to the foetus. In the narrative there is a
coproduction of the ‘goodmother’ and ‘the good abortion’. Wemight even say that the meaning
of the decision to have a selective abortion is displaced – from abortion to being a mother.
Those who have an abortion for the child protect it against pain, and thereby become good
mothers. The sacrifice creates the picture of a woman who would do anything for her child.
She becomes an “appropriate aborter” (Rapp, 1999, p. 237). But within this understanding
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there also lies the implicit picture of another kind of abortion, which is not as legitimate. The
others are ‘bad aborters’. The position as a ‘good mother’ is dependent on the notion that the
foetus is being spared meaningless suffering.
In the case of Klinefelter syndrome it is different. Klinefelter is a ‘mild’ chromosome defect.
A child with the syndrome can grow up and become an adult who has an intelligence within
the normal range. An adult with Down syndrome is visibly affected, but one has to be very
familiar with Klinefelter syndrome in order to differentiate those affected from others – and in
some cases it is not possible even with this knowledge. This makes Vilde’s appropriation of the
“good mother” and “appropriate aborter” position problematic:
I will never, at any time, if I choose to terminate, manage to forgive myself, I will never
be able to, in good conscience know and believe or speculate that it was done because it
was the best for the child.
Vilde, abortion, Klinefelter syndrome
Vilde is hard on herself. She both criticises and accuses her own motivations and reasons
for aborting. We should not, however, misunderstand. It does not automatically imply that
Vilde would accept the same kind of accusations from anybody else, and that they would be in
any position to judge. It mainly concerns her relation to herself, and how she cannot “manage
to forgive” herself. When women make use of culturally recognisable and dominant moral
characters such as the “good mother” and the “self-sacrificing care-giver”, as Vilde, Kjersti
and Sara more or less explicitly do, it may be interpreted as part of a conversation with
themselves. Therefore we should not intervene, but listen. Nor do the uses of these moral
characters automatically imply any judgements of other women who have made similar or
different abortion decisions.12 However, it is possible that it is important for Vilde to present
a picture of herself as not being superficial, the self-criticism showing that she fully grasps the
serious dimensions of her decision.
The next case is about the limitations of the mother’s sacrifice:
And I am a very compassionate person, who will manage everything and provide
care and … So what mom and dad were afraid of was that I would ignore what the
doctors indirectly said to me and say that I will manage this and if the young one here is
going to live thirteen hours, then it will have thirteen good hours with me. They
supported me 100%, but… you have to think of yourself and your husband now. And
my husband said just about the same. I think my husband was relieved by me making
the final decision I did. That this is too difficult to give birth to.
Marit, abortion, Trisomy 13 or 18
In this case, the perspective on the child is turned around. The focus is not on the child’s
future suffering, but on the “thirteen good hours” it could possibly have with its mother.
Birth is therefore the best alternative for the child, and it is not the abortion but the giving birth
12 Rapp (1999, p. 237) touches upon the same problematic when she describes how women who have had a
selective abortion see and evaluate the “blind” abortions: “Yet I was forced to recognise the cultural
judgment that many women with positive diagnoses make about their own circumstances. They considered
themselves to be appropriate mothers, and therefore, tragically, appropriate aborters. While they often
expressed compassion for teenage girls “in trouble”, they did not want to be identified with them in any
social sense”. On the basis of our material, we have a somewhat different interpretation.
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to the child that represents the sacrifice for Marit. The quotation concerns a compassion
which would have gone much too far, and the woman, as “a compassionate person”, must be
held in check by doctors, her mother, father and husband, who would have shared the burden.
There is an immediate danger that Marit should overestimate her own capabilities. Although
several other people amplify the necessity of having an abortion, it is Marit herself who has the
authority to make the decision, and until it is finally made, the others are nervous about the
outcome and what she might do to herself.
Love
Gerd decided to give birth to a child shown to have Down syndrome:
Those we had already told it to when they visited, they have used phrases like “you are
really so brave”, “you are so tough”, and “youmust be so strong”. But we didn’t want to
hear these things. Brave, strong and tough didn’t have anything to do with the choice we
made. The ones who chose to terminate are braver, I think. To go through that process
sounds completely terrible to me. Our decision didn’t have anything to do with us
wanting to be brave, tough or strong, it was just pure love … which made the decision.
And I said to my husband after I last spoke with you: “how can I explain to her what it
was that made us make the decision we made. How can one explain love?” Because it is
really only love which does it… Love of the child that already grew inside of us.
Gerd, birth, Down syndrome after amnio
There is an undertone to the comments from the people who “visited” that giving birth
to a child with Down syndrome contradicts normal reason. We can suspect assumptions
about a difficult future family life with a child with Down syndrome, who will demand
endless amounts of time, self-sacrifice and work. There is no doubt that the rational thing to
do would have been to terminate, as do almost all who carry a foetus shown to have Down
syndrome. But love of the child cuts this argument short and establishes its own specific
counter-logic. Although love is difficult to explain, as it concerns pure emotions that are
placed in opposition to reason and rationality, “love of the child” is capable of producing a
very powerful discourse. In some ways it is defensive, but the love discourse effectively
externalises other considerations and decision criteria. Its real strength shows itself in the
statement that termination of the pregnancy, or acting against the love, “sounds completely
terrible to me”. Love makes it obsolete to be “brave, strong and tough”, even if the situation
is obviously very difficult. There is also another remarkable aspect. Love has a de-
individualising effect, establishing a small collectivity of Gerd and her husband in the
situation (Luhmann, 1982). She not only talks about “the choice we made” and “our
decision”, but even about “the child that grew inside of us”. This stands in rather stark
contrast to the other cases.
Authority and Vulnerability
Each moral, political and legal order is founded on an underlying state of normalcy (Schmitt,
1985 [1922]). Women tell of how the discovery of defects in the foetus casts them into a
borderline state where it is difficult to distinguish the real from the unreal. The nightmare, the
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world of film and ‘aliens’, becomes an intermediary of the meaning. The women find
themselves on the verge of madness, and ‘impossible’ appears to be the best description of
the situation and the dilemmas. The happy pregnancy falls apart, being replaced by an
impermeable pain. It is also clear that the basis for the general normative criteria has broken
down. They have not disappeared, but lost their validity in a situation defined by the discovery
of defects in the foetus. When the fundament for a general principle is gone, there is
constituted a psychological, social and political state of emergency. ‘It is the Sovereign who
rules over the exceptional’. This has a double meaning. First, the Sovereign has the authority
to determine if the underlying state of normalcy, which is the fundament for the validity of the
normative and political order, is in place or not. This means that it is the Sovereign who
declares a state of emergency. In the narratives, it is only the women with defects detected in
the foetus who have access to this unique insight as to how the state of normalcy is dissolved
and replaced by the unreal, impossible borderline state. Second, the Sovereign has the
authority to make decisions during the state of emergency. After the discovery of defects, the
women have an exclusive understanding of the situation and of what the abortion dilemma
involves. This constitutes their sovereignty over the decision.
There emerges an inapproachable exclusivity in this state of emergency. Only women
who have themselves experienced the detection of defects in their foetus can begin to
understand what is at stake in this situation. The narratives employ known characters
such as the ‘good aborter’ and ‘good mother’. They point to general and dominant moral
criteria for human behaviour. But it is up to the pregnant woman herself as to whether or not
these characters will be roused and introduced into the situation at all. No one else can
do this. And no one can object if these characters do not appear in a narrative. It is not
possible for those on the outside either to judge or to criticise these women’s presentation of
themselves as a “self-sacrificing care-giver” – or anything else. Also, ultimately it is not
possible for society to offer any fundamental help if the women condemn themselves and
their choices.
At the same time, language faces its limits. The narratives are filled with unfathomable
and obscure metaphors, and the women themselves relate that they are not capable of
communicating the nature of their situation. It is, after all, an attempt to do something
impossible. There is an interesting link between this situation and some central aspects of
the condition of disability in society. In her book Staring: How We Look, which discusses
the social and psychological dimensions of disability, Garland-Thomson (2009) makes an
interesting distinction between staring and the gaze. The gaze has both obvious and subtle
normalising effects, categorising people and drawing the line between normality and deviance.
The gaze constantly introduces social and cultural order into the world of experience, carrying
the weight of history, both of disability and normality in general. Staring, however, does the
very opposite. Unwillingly we are almost hypnotised by ‘the staree’ (a linguistic invention by
Garland-Thomson, designating the person being stared at), and we are lost in her, although it
is considered impolite to stare. Because we are overwhelmed and magnetised by the pure
presence of the staree, we are simply unable to label or categorise her. Therefore, staring
dissolves order and represents the moment of transgression. This is very close to what happens
when a deviance is discovered in the foetus. In a metaphorical sense the mother is staring at the
imagined disability of the child within her body. The ordinary categories explode or run wild,
which signals that they are of no use to her in such a situation. The mother has no choice other
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than to stare, being a mental prisoner of the almost unnamable features of her foetus, and the
very experience is transgressing the ordering effects of the concepts of disability and normality.
And it is exactly in this condition of staring, of losing herself in the extraordinary nature of the
staree, that the mother has to make the decision of whether or not to abort.
The combination of exclusive insight and partial communicative breakdown constitutes an
exclusive subject position for pregnant women in the question of selective abortion (Foucault,
1985). Partners, family, friends and medical personnel can influence, give indirect advice or
inform as to what most other women choose to do. But they do not really grasp the important
dimensions of the situation, and therefore cannot possess any decisive authority.13 Because the
possibility of establishing a communicative community – not to mention rationality
(Habermas, 1984) – around the abortion decision is blocked in important ways, there emerges
a Sovereign in this state of emergency.14
There is an ambivalent relation between our perspective and the conceptualisations of
the women as ‘moral pioneers’ who are in different ways mapping new and unknown
terrain. Just to state the trivial and obvious: the field of PND and selective abortion is not
new – in spite of the fact that the range of techniques is constantly expanding – and is
therefore hardly calling for any pioneers in the classical sense. This is also the case on the
normative and moral level. The political debates have been tense and long-lasting. Our
analysis, however, indicates that despite the entirety of the problematic around selective
abortion being morally disputed, and the fact that many see worrying general develop-
ments in this area, a woman’s decision is unencumbered and therefore in important
respects is unavailable for external, normative evaluation. There begins to appear some-
thing like a ‘Decisionism’, where a pure decision is made. The abortion decision establishes
its own immanent criteria that cannot be traced back to general perspectives transcending
the situation, but rather emerges as an integrated part of the decision itself.15 This is an
important dimension to the position as Sovereign. Therefore, the terrain is always and
repeatedly new and unknown. There are, however, no moral maps being produced that
13 Schwennesen and Koch (2012) present the socio-ethical argument that as all prenatal knowledge is socially
constructed, the health personnel should both admit and embrace their influence by offering some advice to
the pregnant women. Then they would provide ‘good’ care, built on a realistic understanding of their
unavoidable power. Schwennesen and Koch concentrate on the question of further testing after the
presentation of individual risks. In the situation of abortion decision, however, the socially constructed
categories tend to dissolve, and thereby also the above potential for good care. Also, Schwennesen and Koch
seem to invite health personnel to a strategic communication about the foetus, which in our view would be
inadvertently revealed in the situation. If a woman realises that a main intention of the communication is to
comfort her, the effect might be the very opposite.
14 This is also clear from a legal perspective. Even though selective abortion is a free choice only up to the 12th
week of pregnancy, and the mild regime which emphasises women’s subjective evaluations and wishes is
replaced by a much stricter set of laws after week 18, it is clear that the normal structure of law does not
hold for selective abortion. Jurisprudence abdicates in favour of a flexible ‘real-legality’, or rather,
exceptional regulation which respects women’s position as Sovereign. Selective abortion takes place
flexibly long after the 20th week, and meetings with the abortion committees are not marked by
reassessments.
15 This marks the limits of the pregnant woman as an individual manager being caught by the mental world of
probabilities and abstract, statistical risk categories (Samerski, 2009). The decision criteria of this kind of
rationality dissolves in the microstate of emergency. They might exercise a considerable socio-psychological
power during the phases of prenatal testing, but not in the decision situation, after something serious is
detected.
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can be used by other women later, and half of the role of a pioneer vanishes, namely, that
of facilitating the access and orientation of those who follow.
The women are not just Sovereigns. They must ‘live with the decision for the rest of their
lives’. This creates an extreme vulnerability for the consequences of choosing whether or not
to abort. The women’s bodies and souls are subject to their own decisions (Foucault, 1985).
Their fate, deeply affected by the choice, is neither regulated nor protected by generally
applicable legal or moral principles, but rather is delivered into a pure decisionism, even
though it is their own. The discovery of defects in the foetus therefore transforms these women
into something Agamben (1998) has conceptualised as “bare life”.
The pregnant women are directly and totally at the mercy of their own sovereign decision.
It will inscribe itself on body and soul for large parts of the rest of their lives. They ‘can’t go the
rest of [their lives] and see children with Down syndrome’ if they have themselves chosen to
abort; they cannot manage the thought of pressing the life out of a foetus through induced
labour; they cannot envision stopping the foetus’ strong heart beat; they are afraid of being
overwhelmed as a care-giver if they do not abort and are frightened that a continued
pregnancy will only provide great pain for the child. Fundamental pain will almost inevitably
result from the decision. The only partial exception is the love discourse, which appears to
establish a type of protection. Even in cases in which the foetus has no chance of survival, the
abortion decision is a life and death decision which affects the woman’s biological and
existential condition. In this manner, the women’s relations to themselves are constituted by a
relation between the Sovereign and ‘Homo Sacer’, simultaneously occupying both ends of the
continuum of authority and sacrifice in the state of emergency. This is a dual position, being
marked by both extreme authority and vulnerability.
Relation to Oneself: The Sacrifice
The situation after the discovery of defects in the foetus does not just produce a dilemma but
a compulsion. The women cannot avoid the question of whether or not to abort. But they need
to give the decision a meaning, even if it means doing so uphill and against all odds. The
situation presents itself as fundamentally chaotic and meaningless. Nonetheless, the women
struggle to create order and meaning. They mobilise tropes of the good mother, women’s
responsibility, the good aborter, the pregnant woman who sacrifices herself for the child, the
avoidance of suffering, ‘following your heart’ and all-encompassing love.
The theme of sacrifice seems to be central. Although it comes in several different versions, it
is the mother, and not the foetus or the child, who is going to be sacrificed. Therefore, it is
fundamentally a self-sacrifice that the women describe. In some cases the self-sacrifice is really
made, and in others it is not. The real and potential self-sacrifices concern different
dimensions. The self-sacrifices that are really made are the pregnant woman’s moral principles
and her special relation to the child, while the self-sacrifices that are too big and heavy concern
her own health and well-being. The latter remain potential, and for good reasons. The theme
of self-sacrifice seems to be most dominant when the decision ends in abortion. Abortion is in
no way an easy escape, and it is a recurrent theme that the abortion is made for and not
against the child. Women are often prepared to set aside their own emotional needs and
general moral convictions in order to prevent the foetus from suffering. The good aborting
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mother, the good aborter and the responsible woman are subject positions that are related to,
and depend on, the self-sacrifice. Therefore it represents a privileged meaning dimension, and
a core element in the narratives. Even when the self-sacrifice is not made, it is equally
dominant in the discourse on the reasons for the abortion. When the self-sacrifice, in some
cases, appears to be too great to guide the decision, it happens only after weighty and
‘impossible’ deliberations. It then becomes the limit that is ultimately impossible to transgress,
although the woman may be very tempted to do so. In such cases the pregnancy may turn into
a risk, where the threat is coming from the woman as sovereign decision maker. In Vilde’s
case, the very lack of self-sacrifice is turned into self-accusations, self-inflicted suffering and
pain of not accepting her justifications for the decision as being good enough – as if it is taking
a moral revenge on her.
At the same time, there is a related message on another level. Fighting a battle involving
all of one’s emotions becomes an unavoidable part of the process. Nothing can be concealed.
The most brutal words must be used. By asking questions concerning one’s own sanity and the
humanity of the foetus, it is revealed that the women’s relation to themselves finds itself on
the ‘borderline’. It is almost too much, and we get the impression that they are not far from
a nervous breakdown. The emotional involvement becomes so powerful that it can border on
madness. In a way it is communicated that the women have already been sacrificed by the very
situation into which they have been brought by the pregnancy, the detection of serious defects
in the foetus and the compulsion to make a fast, and in the end lonely, decision on whether or
not to abort. This is different from the self-sacrifice. It is not deliberate or chosen, but
unavoidable and a fundamental dimension of their existential condition. The consequence on
the normative level, however, is that they become immune against any kind of critique from
other people or institutions. It is not possible to pass any moral judgements on a person who
already has been sacrificed. With the exception of Vilde, it also protects against self-criticism.
In some ways, the women are outside the realms and space of ordinary, normative order – not
only as sovereigns, but also as sacrificed.
The impacts of the sacrifices are especially felt by the women who decide to abort. It is not
limited to them, but it seems as if the women who do not abort are somehow protected or
shielded from the effects. This is partly related to their reasons, or more precisely their
experiences of the forces present in the situation. For Gerd, there was – on a certain level – no
decision made about abortion. The understanding of love lends itself to a belief in destiny. It is
not chosen, but rather affects people. Love chooses people, not the other way round, and thus
creates a fundamental necessity. It was love of the child that “made that decision”, and the
necessary strength lay neither with the woman nor with her husband, but with love. In this
way, the decision was lifted from the shoulders of the woman and her husband, and given to
the power that possesses them.
Gerd has a strong orientation towards the difficulties and challenges of the life together with
the child with Down syndrome after birth: “Yes, and so we are not afraid of the challenges any
of us, and both share the belief that we do not receive more than we can endure… ”. But even
this is framed by a belief in fate. Existence gives them only that which they can manage. Gerd
thus communicates that there lies a greater reason behind these events, which is inscrutable.
There are hardly any explicit Christian or religious motifs and arguments present in our
interviews, unless as negations such as “I am not a religious person”. We must, however, be
aware of the different levels of the discourses. Behind the secular veil there are some Christian
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figures that are not easily overseen.16 The sacrifices in different versions are the most obvious.17 It
is also possible to make arguments in favour of the love discourse having, at least partly, religious
origins. In this context it is also tempting to recall Schmitt’s argument that most of the important
political concepts are secularised religious concepts, including that of the Sovereign. Nevertheless,
the severity and harsh reality of the field of selective abortion does not lend itself easily to any kind
of superficial everyday rationality. Other dimensions come inadvertently to the foreground, and
we tap into some deeper levels of the cultural discourses.18 However, in this context we can only
make some very short and preliminary indications of these.
A Final Remark
Our analysis shows a central paradox. At the core of the social field of selective abortion lies a
series of states of emergency. These arise continuously, thereby producing a stable situation.
The states of emergency define society’s normal relation to the decisions of selective abortion,
and constitute the most fundamental aspects of regulation in this area. The state of emergency
and the state of normalcy therefore blend together. The distinction itself is undermined, and its
own ‘zone of indistinction’ appears around the abortion decision. This characterises the legal,
political and normative regimes in the field.
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